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THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF PRIVATE TREBLE
DAMAGE SUITS: FACT OR FANTASY
ALFRED L. PARKERt
Section 7 of the Sherman Act, as amended by section 4 of the
Clayton Act, gives a private right of action for treble damages to
persons "injured in . . . business or property by reason of anything

I
forbidden in the antitrust laws .....
This section was meant to provide compensation for those affected
by violations, to discourage violations, 2 and "to supply an ancillary
force of private investigators to supplement the Department of Justice
in law enforcement." 3 Or as expressed by one Court, "The trebledamage action was intended not merely to redress injury to an
individual through the prohibited practices, but to aid in achieving
the broad social object of the statute." 4 Thus the successful private
treble-damage suit, which has been described as a "curious combination of public regulatory and private compensatory law,"5 will result
in the awarding of damages which may be properly viewed to include
both "punitive" and "compensatory" elements.
The recent Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition (widely referred to as the Stigler Report, after the Task Forces'
Chairman, Dr. George Stigler of the University of Chicago) has
emphasized the necessity for "punitive" antitrust sanctions noting
that it is essential that the sanctions for violations be effective in
compelling compliance. 6 But, the report concludes, ".

.

. the deter-

rent sanction in antitrust is weak." 7 Although the violator may be
imprisoned and fined, it is recognized that prison terms are almost
tAssociate Professor of Economics, University of New Mexico.
1. Clayton Act §4, 15 U.S.C.A. §15 (1964),formerly ch. 323, §4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914). Section 4
provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust law may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
2. Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 4 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1942); Fanchon &
Marco v. Paramount Pictures, 100 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd, 215 F.2d 167 (9th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955); Weinberg v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205
(E.D.N.Y. 1942).
3. Weinberg v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
4. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955).
5. Antitrust Enforcement By Private Parties:Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage
Suit. 61 Yale L.J., 1010, 1011 (1952).
6. Stigler et al., Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition, 2 Antitrust L. &
Econ. Rev. 13, 32-33 (1969).
7. Id. at 33.
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never used and that the maximum existing criminal fine ($50,000) is
clearly inadequate. 8
The possibility of private treble-damage suits providing an additional deterrent effect was also recognized in the Stigler Report.
While noting serious limitations to the use of private suits as a
deterrent, 9 the report also states that ". . . the excess over actual
damages and costs represents a pure windfall to the private plaintiff."1° This statement would clearly suggest that damages awarded
the successful plaintiff in a private treble-damage suit are excessive.
Nevertheless, given the inadequacy of existing criminal penalties this
"windfall," as defined by the Stigler Report, becomes perhaps the
only significant "punitive" antitrust sanction. The existence and
magnitude of this "windfall" thus becomes extremely important in
determining the effectiveness of existing "punitive" antitrust
sanctions and the dimensions of the existing incentive for private
enforcement.
If we define the injury resulting from the violation as "actual
damages and costs" we may now divide the damages awarded the
plaintiff in a successful private treble-damage suit into two components-"compensatory damages" and "punitive damages." "Compensatory damages" are defined as those which reimburse the plaintiff
for the injury sustained. The term "punitive damages" (now synonymous with the "windfall" of the Stigler Report) is used to identify
those damages awarded in excess of the injury actually sustained.
The total damage award (compensatory and punitive damages) less
attorney's fees and related expenses provide the incentive for private
enforcement. The deterrent effect of the private treble-damage suit is
reflected in the level of punitive damages awarded. Thus it must
follow that, other things equal, the greater the level of punitive
damages the greater incentive for private enforcement and the
stronger the deterrent sanction in antitrust.
The treble-damage provision states that the person injured ".
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."" This would apparently
imply a one-third and two-thirds division of trebled damages between
8. Id. at 33.
... judges are reluctant to authorize damage awards that seriously hurt a
company; damages are difficult to prove in price fixing cases; and most important,
the injury caused by a price-fixing conspiracy is often so widely diffused (for
example, among millions of consumers) that no one has an incentive to bring suit.
The government itself can sue for damages only when it was the victim of the
unlawful conspiracy.
9. Id. at 33.
10. Id. at 34.
11. Clayton Act §4, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1964).
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compensatory and punitive damages. In fact punitive damages tend to
vary greatly from the two-thirds figure inferred by the treble damage
provision.
The simple numerical example developed below will help to clarify
the division of trebled damages between compensatory and punitive
damages and place in perspective the incentive and deterrent effects
of private treble-damage suits.
THE MEASUREMENT OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Assume that reliable estimates of damages resulting from price-fixing indicate that the State Highway Department (or other state or
local government agency) was overcharged $100,000 in 1960. As is
generally the case, assume a substantial period of time has elapsed
between the date at which damages were sustained and the date at
which damages are awarded. Thus damages are awarded at the end of
1970.
In current case law the courts have rejected arguments that the
time interval between the date of injury and the date damages are
awarded is a factor to be included in damage computations. This
rejection is evident in court rulings that interest is not recoverable in
statutory actions for double and treble damages,' 2 and that the
amount of damages should not be adjusted to reflect the greater
13
purchasing power of the dollar in the years injury was sustained.
This means that, assuming the jury accepted the $100,000 damage
estimate, no adjustment will be made for interest or changes in the
purchasing power of money. Plaintiff will therefore receive treble
damages of $300,000, plus the cost of suit and a reasonable attorney's
fee. Discussion of the latter two elements will be deferred for the
moment.
The correct measure of compensatory damages must include not
only the overcharges paid, but also compensation for the loss of use of
this purchasing power in the years between the injury and the
awarding of damages. Thus, in our example, the $100,000 damage
figure seriously underestimates the injury sustained by plaintiff.
THE RATIONALE FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
The rationale for the above conclusion is provided by either of two
approaches. First, we may consider plaintiff to have an extensive list
of alternative uses of additional funds, but with a fixed budget.
Second, we may consider plaintiff with a fixed number of indispensable projects, but a somewhat more flexible budget.
.12. 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, §267 (1965).
13. Locklin v. Switzer Bros., Inc., Trade Cas. 186,524 (N.D. II1. 1969).
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Applying the first approach in the example developed above, we
may logically assume that the state or local government involved has
a number of alternative uses for the funds that were paid in the
overcharge. For example, the overcharge could have been allocated
among the several uses listed, in order of priority, below:
1st Educational Program X
2nd Highway Project #1
3rd Flood Control Project
4th Highway Project #2

nth Time Deposits
n + 1 Cash Balances.
It may be argued that absent the price-fixing violation the
overcharges paid would have been applied to one or more of the
above listed uses. It is, of course, possible to estimate the return from
only the last two of the listed alternatives. If plaintiff would have
placed the money paid as an overcharge in time deposits and thus
earned 6 percent on these funds, then plaintiff must receive the
amount of the overcharge plus the interest that would have accrued
in order to be fully compensated for the injury. For our example this
amounts to $181,402 ($100,000 + $81,402 interest).' 4 The fact that the
investment in time deposits was a low priority use of these funds
suggests that even this figure ($181,402) underestimates compensatory
damages.
Stated negatively, the $100,000 figure provides an acceptable
estimate of compensatory damages only if it is assumed that the funds
saved, absent the overcharge, would have been held as surplus cash
balances, thus providing no benefit (not even a feeling of security) to
the plaintiff. Such an assumption is heroic to say the very least.
Support for the inclusion of interest in damage computations may
also be provided by the second approach, i.e., considering plaintiff to
have a fixed number of indispensable projects, but a somewhat more
flexible budget.
Applying this approach to our example we may argue that as a
result of the price-fixing conspiracy plaintiff has been required to
obtain additional funds to finance the indispensable projects. Here we
are assuming that the purchases that resulted in the overcharge were
in connection with one of the indispensable projects, i.e., a project
14. $81,402 is six percent interest compounded quarterly on $100,000 for ten years, 1961
through 1970.
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that could not be delayed. Thus plaintiff has been required, for
example, to issue municipal bonds in excess of the amount that would
have been issued absent the overcharge. This approach clearly
suggests that the correct measure of plaintiff compensatory damages
in our example would be the overcharge plus $81,402 in additional
interest expense (assuming a 6 percent interest on municipal bonds for
10 years).
Regardless of whether the interest figure is viewed as in the first
approach as income lost or as in the second approach as added
expense, the interest figure clearly does represent damages to the
plaintiff which resulted from the violation.
COMPENSATORY VS. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Application of the above argument for the inclusion of interest in
damage computations has a significant effect on the division of the
total recovery between compensatory and punitive damages.
In our example as summarized below, the inclusion of interest in
the measure of compensatory damages reduces punitive damages to
less than 40 percent of the total recovery.

Single
Damages

Treble
Damages

Plaintiff's Defendant's
Punitive
Total Compensatory Punitive
Damages
Damages
Damages
Recovery,

100,000

300,000

300,000

$181,402
(60.5%)

118,598
(39.5%)

118,598
(39.5%)

The introduction of a reasonable attorney's fee and the tax
treatment of treble damages further complicate the division of total
recovery between compensatory and punitive damages. In our
example we shall assume that $30,000 in attorney's fees are awarded
by the court and that attorney and client have agreed on a
contingency fee equal to one-third of the total recovery. Thus plaintiff
will pay $110,000 of the $330,000 total recovery in attorney's fees.
Plaintiff's net total recovery is now $220,000, and compensatory and
punitive damages for plaintiff are 82.5 percent and 17.5 percent,
respectively, of the net total recovery. The effect is again summarized
below.
Court
Awarded
Attorney's
Fee
30,000

Total
Recovery
330,000

Attorney's
Fees
110,000

Plaintiff's Defendant's
Net
Total Compensatory Punitive Punitive
Damages Damages
Damages
Recovery
83,598
38,598
181,402
220,000
(31.5%)
(17.5%)
(82.5%)
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The tax-exempt plaintiff is of course unaffected by the introduction
of taxes, but defendant's punitive damages are affected. Amended
IRC §162 disallows any deduction for two-thirds of any judgment or
settlement paid in a private antitrust action when the defendant has
been previously convicted or has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere in
a related criminal action. It thus appears that $200,000 of the total
payment is not deductible as ordinary business expense, but $130,000
is deductible.15 Defendant's payment adjusted for taxes becomes
$265,000 (= $200,000 + $65,000), and defendant's punitive damages
(=$265,000 - $181,402) are thus reduced to $83,598 or 31.5 percent of
defendant's payment adjusted for taxes.
Caution is required in the interpretation of the dollar amounts and
percentages estimated for both plaintiff's and defendant's "punitive
damages." First it should be noted that the computation of defendant's "punitive damages" has ignored defendant's litigation expense
including fees for legal counsel, expert witnesses and related expenses.
These additional expenses clearly increase defendant's punitive
damages. More important, the computations of plaintiff's and defendant's punitive damages have assumed that the jury will award the
actual amount of the overcharge paid. If the jury, in response to a
combination of conflicting expert testimony and knowledge of the
trebling provision, 16 awards damages equal to one-half the actual
overcharge, punitive damages may disappear. This is demonstrated in
the following table:
Single
Damages

Treble
Damages

50,000

150,000

Court
Awarded
Attorney's
Total
Fees
Recovery
30,000

180,000

Net
Plaintiff's Defendant's
Total Compensatory Punitive
Punitive
Recovery Damages
Damages Damages
120,000

181,402

-61,402

-41,402

Under these circumstances the plaintiff does not receive and
defendant is not required to pay punitive damages. The recognition of
these other factors which may affect plaintiff's and defendant's
punitive damages does not, however, alter the impact of the Court's
decision to exclude the time element from damage computation. It is
clear that this decision reduces punitive damages well below the
two-thirds figure implied by the treble damage provision.
AN ALTEIRNATIVE METHOD OF COMPUTATION
The obvious alternative to the present method of damage computation would be to include the time element as a factor in damage
15.

All tax computations assume a 50 percent tax rate.

16. Parker, Treble Damage Action-A Financial Deterrent to Antitrust Violations?, 16
Antitrust Bull. 483-505 (1971).
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computations. Such an alternative, using the example of the previous
section, is developed below. The court-awarded attorney's fee, the
contingency fee arrangement, and the tax treatment of damages
remain the same as in the earlier example.
When the "time element" is included in the damage computation,
single damages become the overcharge plus the interest that could
have been earned (or saved) in the time interval between the injury
and the awarding of damages. Therefore, as summarized below, single
damages (assuming 6 percent interest compounded quarterly) becomes $181,402. Plaintiff's punitive damages are increased to 52.6
percent of the net total recovery while defendant's punitive damages
are increased to 61.3% of defendant payment adjusted for taxes
($468,505).

Single
Damages

Treble
Damages

Court
Awarded
Attorney's
Fee

181,402

544,206

30,000

Total
Recovery

Plaintiff's Defendant's
Net
Punitive
Total Compensatory Punitive
Damages Damages
Recovery Damages

574,206

382,804

181,402
(47.4%)

201,402
(52.6%)

287,103
(61.3%)

These computations are based on the assumption that the jury
awards the actual overcharge plus interest: If the jury in fact awards
damages equal to one-half the overcharge punitive damages for
plaintiff and defendant are affected as follows:
90,701

272,103

30,000

302,103

201,402

181,402
(90.1%)

20,000
(9.9%)

60,351
(25.0%)

Plaintiff's punitive damages remain at almost 10 percent of the net
total recovery while defendant's punitive damages remain at 25
percent of defendant's payment adjusted for taxes.
CONCLUSIONS
There appears to be no objective standard by which to judge the
adequacy of punitive damages awarded under the treble damage
provision: When this problem is viewed from the perspective of
providing an incentive for private enforcement and an effective
deterrent to antitrust violations the primary issue does become clear.
Prospective recovery must be sufficient both to encourage-those with
valid claims to initiate private action and to discourage the potential
violator. At the same time prospective recovery must not be so large
as to encourage unwarranted private suits. Achieving such a balance
is clearly a difficult if not impossible task.
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Recognizing this problem the numerical examples that have been
developed above suggest the following conclusions: First, the division
of the treble damage award between compensatory and punitive
damages may vary greatly from the one-third and two-thirds division
implied by the treble damage provision. Second, the decision of the
courts to exclude the time element from damage computations has
significantly reduced the possibility that the plaintiff will receive or
that the defendant will be required to pay punitive damages. Third,
the examples suggest that the incentive provided to the plaintiff and
the deterrent effect on the defendant are substantially less than that
implied by the treble damage provision. Finally, the deterrent
sanction in the private treble damage suit is minimal and not an
effective substitute or supplement to adequate criminal penalties:

